The claim that was scored before anyone read it
Litigation propensity and severity models act on a file at the moments that decide its value: the reserve, the first offer, the authority the handler carries. Follow those moments in order, and the governance question answers itself.
Take a bodily-injury file and follow it as a sequence of events. The models act at particular moments, and the moments are not the ones most discussions of AI in claims talk about.
Notice. The claim arrives with an injury reported. Within minutes, before any human has read anything, two predictions are attached: how likely this file is to end in litigation, and what it is likely to cost. The inputs are what intake collected, what the policy record holds, and whatever the insurer has learned from files that resembled this one — the injury described, the mechanism of the collision, whether an ambulance attended, the delay in reporting, the venue the loss occurred in, the claimant’s claim history, sometimes the vehicle, sometimes the text of the notification itself.
Routing. The severity prediction decides who gets the file and how much authority they carry. This is the least controversial use and probably the most valuable: a file predicted to be expensive going to an experienced handler on day one, rather than being discovered to be expensive months later by a handler who cannot settle it, is a straightforward gain for everyone, claimant included.
The reserve. The insurer must estimate what this claim will ultimately cost and hold that amount. Historically the initial reserve was a handler’s judgement made on almost no information, and it was reliably wrong in both directions. A model fitted across thousands of closed files does this better. That is not a small improvement: under-reserving produces low offers and reserve strengthening later, over-reserving locks up capital and distorts how the account is rated, and both have real consequences for real files.
The first contact. Somewhere in the first days the handler speaks to the claimant, and by now the file already carries a propensity score. If it says this claimant is likely to instruct a lawyer, the handling changes. Contact is faster and more attentive, an offer may be made earlier, and the file is worked to reach a resolution before representation arrives.
Here is where the first genuinely difficult question sits, and it is not answered by whether the prediction is accurate. Treating a claimant more attentively because a model predicts they will lawyer up is either good service or a manoeuvre, and which one it is depends entirely on whether the early offer is adequate. An early, fair offer to a claimant the insurer expects to litigate is a better outcome than a slow, contested one. An early, low offer made specifically to close a file before the claimant learns what it is worth is a different act, and both are produced by the same score and look the same in the workflow.
Representation. A lawyer comes on the file. From that moment the insurer’s own data says the claim will cost more, which is true as a prediction and circular as a justification: claims with lawyers cost more partly because lawyers obtain more, and partly because claimants who instruct lawyers had worse injuries in the first place. The model does not separate those and does not need to for reserving purposes. It matters greatly if the same number is used to argue about what the claim deserves.
Plaintiff counsel, meanwhile, is running an inference of their own. Counsel who handles volume against the same insurers learns their patterns: which files get quick generous offers, which get silence, where authority sits, how the posture changes at particular stages. Segmentation that is legible from the outside becomes a strategy from the outside. The early-offer policy for high-propensity files is, from a claimant firm’s perspective, a reason to make representation visible early.
Reserve movement. The prediction updates as the file develops, and the reserve moves with it. Those movements are recorded, dated, and later readable as a history of what the insurer thought this claim was worth at each point. Handlers have always known that reserve history is sensitive. What is new is that the movements are now partly produced by a system whose reasoning is not written down in the file, so the history shows a number changing without showing a mind changing.
The settlement window. The offer is made, and the authority behind it came from somewhere. If the severity prediction informed the authority, the insurer has a recorded estimate of the claim’s ultimate cost sitting alongside its offer, and the difference between them is a number that now exists in a system somebody may one day read. It may be entirely explicable — ultimate cost includes defence expense, interest and outcomes that may not occur, and is not the same quantity as today’s fair settlement. But the explanation has to be in the file, written at the time, because reconstructing it two years later in response to a bad-faith allegation is the weakest possible position.
Litigation. Suit is filed, and the internal documents become a subject rather than a background. What the insurer predicted, when it predicted it, what it reserved, what it offered, and what the handler recorded between those events are all potentially in play. What is actually obtainable, and what privilege or work-product protection covers it, is a question of procedural law that this piece answers for no jurisdiction; read it as a reason to build the file carefully rather than as a statement of any rule.
Two features of the file are worth attending to regardless of how that question resolves. The first is whether the claim-specific reasoning exists at all: liability assessed on the evidence, injury assessed on the records, quantum assessed against comparable outcomes, written by the handler. The second is whether the sequence of events reads as reasoning or as compliance with a number. Those are different files, and only one of them is defensible.
What the models actually learned
Everything above assumes the predictions are good. They are, in the narrow sense that matters to an actuary: they predict what closed files cost. That is also the limitation, and it is structural rather than a defect of implementation.
A severity model fitted on settled claims learns settlement outcomes. Where past outcomes were depressed — unrepresented claimants who accepted early offers, claim types the insurer historically undervalued, venues where claimants rarely pursued — the model learns those amounts as the value of such claims. Used for reserving, that is exactly right: the model is predicting what the insurer will pay, and it will pay that. Used as a view of what a claim is worth, it encodes the past into the present with the authority of a computation.
The propensity model has a sharper version of the same problem, because acting on the prediction changes the label. Predict litigation, settle early to prevent it, and the file closes without litigation, which the model records as a case where litigation did not occur. Over enough cycles the system is learning about its own interventions and reporting the result as a property of claimants.
The judgement
A severity model is a reserving tool that has been handed a second job nobody wrote down. As a reserving tool it is better than what it replaced and its adoption is unambiguously good. As an input to negotiation it carries the insurer’s own history into a conversation about what one injured person is owed, with none of the visible reasoning that a handler’s valuation used to leave behind.
The governance that follows is not complicated and mostly is not in place: the handler’s valuation recorded before the prediction is seen, the reason for each reserve movement written in words, the difference between predicted ultimate cost and offered settlement explained on the file rather than in a policy document, and retention of enough of the model’s state to reconstruct a score months later. All four are things an insurer can do without waiting to be told.
The prediction and the offer now live in the same system, a few fields apart. Whatever the gap between them means, it is written down, and somebody will eventually read it.
Ariski's take
A severity model is a reserving instrument. Used for reserving it is straightforwardly good: reserves set from a pattern across thousands of comparable files are better estimates than reserves set from one handler's recollection, and better estimates are better for everybody, including the claimant whose file is no longer under-reserved into a low offer. What we object to is the migration — the same prediction, built for the balance sheet, arriving in the negotiation as a target. Augmentation would mean the handler knows what the book says a file like this costs and then decides what this file is worth. Replacement is when the prediction becomes the number to hold, and the handler's remaining job is to obtain it. Nobody announces that transition, and both versions look identical in the system.
Rules in your jurisdiction
Deadlines, fault rules and minimum coverage differ by state and country. Pick yours to see the rules that apply to this topic.
Select a jurisdiction to see its rules.
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Alaska’s shared-fault rule is one sentence long and contains no percentage and no bar of any kind: «In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to a person or harm to property, contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for the injury attributable to the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery» (§ 09.17.060, from § 1 ch 139 SLA 1986). «But does not bar recovery» is the whole rule, so a claimant ninety per cent to blame still recovers a tenth. The machinery is prescribed as well: the court «shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories» stating «the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded» and «the percentage of the total fault that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, person who has been released from liability, or other person responsible», with the trier of fact directed to weigh «both the nature of the conduct of each person at fault, and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed» (§ 09.17.080(a)–(b)). ALASKA HAS ABOLISHED JOINT LIABILITY, AND THAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE A CLAIMANT MUST PLAN FOR: «The court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of several liability in accordance with that party’s percentage of fault» (§ 09.17.080(d)), so a claimant who sues one of two at-fault drivers collects that driver’s share and no more, and fault is allocated to settled and released persons too. The apportionment also runs on a statutory definition of fault that is wider than negligence: «“fault” includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless, or intentional … The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product …, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages» (§ 09.17.900) — so a claimant’s own conduct after the crash is apportionable, not merely their driving. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years, from the same sentence of the same section: «a person may not bring an action … (2) for personal injury or death, or injury to the rights of another not arising on contract and not specifically provided otherwise … unless the action is commenced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action» (§ 09.10.070(a)(2)). The section’s own catchline reads «Actions for torts, for injury to personal property, for certain statutory liabilities … to be brought in two years». As with the property clock, the trigger the statute names is ACCRUAL, not the date of the collision. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years on the policy, and Alaska INVERTS the usual pattern — the contract period is only one year longer than the tort clock, where in most states it is far longer: «Unless the action is commenced within three years, a person may not bring an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, except as provided in AS 09.10.040, or as otherwise provided by law, or, except if the provisions of this section are waived by contract» (§ 09.10.053). THE CLOSING WORDS ARE THE TRAP, AND THEY ARE THE REASON THIS FIGURE MUST NOT BE READ AS A FLOOR: the three years apply «except if the provisions of this section are waived by contract», so an Alaska policy’s own suit clause may shorten the period, and § 09.10.053 does not say by how much. Whether any Alaska statute fixes a minimum period for such a clause has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here: §§ 21.42.160, 21.42.170 and 21.42.175 were read in full and contain no floor, but no full-text search of title 21 was possible, so the absence of a floor is NOT asserted. |
| Regulator | Alaska Division of Insurance, Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Alaska →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Where two or more people are at fault, «the liability to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault but if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally», and nothing renders a person liable for loss «to which the person’s fault has not contributed» (Contributory Negligence Act, s. 1). Vehicle-damage recovery from your own insurer is instead scaled by the prescribed fault determination rules (Insurance Act, s. 585.1(4)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [4] Two years from the day the claimant first knew, or ought to have known, that the injury had occurred, that it was attributable to the defendant’s conduct and that it warrants bringing a proceeding — or ten years after the claim arose, whichever expires first (Limitations Act, s. 3(1)). Note the Alberta drafting: the Act does not bar the claim, it entitles the defendant to «immunity from liability» on pleading it. |
| Regulator | Government of Alberta — automobile insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Alberta →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Liability for damage caused by the circulation of vehicles is objective (strict) — Código Civil y Comercial arts. 1757 and 1769 — and «puede ser excluida o limitada por la incidencia del hecho del damnificado en la producción del daño» (art. 1729): the victim’s own act reduces, or in an extreme case excludes, the award. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [1] |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 1 years from the claim [2] Actions founded on the insurance contract prescribe in one year from when the obligation became enforceable (Ley 17.418 art. 58); the steps of the loss-adjustment procedure interrupt it. |
| Regulator | Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación (SSN) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Argentina →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Contributory negligence and assumption of risk reduce, never bar: «the claimant’s action is not barred, but the full damages shall be reduced in proportion to the relative degree of the claimant’s fault which is a proximate cause of the injury or death». No percentage threshold appears anywhere in the section; the single exception is conduct rather than a figure, since there is no right to comparative negligence «in favor of any claimant who has intentionally, wilfully or wantonly caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death» (A.R.S. § 12-2505(A)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years after the cause of action accrues «for injuries done to the person of another», and for injuries «when death ensues from such injuries, which action shall be considered as accruing at the death of the party injured» (A.R.S. § 12-542(1)–(2)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [3] This is a floor on what the policy may impose, not a statutory limitation period: § 20-1115(A)(3) voids any clause «limiting the time within which an action may be brought to a period of less than two years from the time the cause of action accrues» for insurance other than property and marine and transportation, where the floor is one year, and § 20-1115(A)(2) voids any clause preventing suit more than six months after accrual. The operative deadline is whatever the policy says, no shorter than that floor. Section 12-548(A)(1) gives six years on «a contract in writing that is executed in this state», but the section speaks of an action for debt, and whether that framing reaches every first-party policy action has not been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | Arizona Department of Insurance and Financial Institutions (DIFI) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Arizona →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence In the actions that survive — vehicle damage, and the narrow injury exceptions — liability «is in proportion to the degree to which each person was at fault», is «apportioned equally» where it is not possible to establish different degrees, and never reaches loss to which a person’s fault did not contribute (Negligence Act, s. 1). The Act’s definitions include proceedings in the Civil Resolution Tribunal, where many vehicle-damage disputes are actually decided. |
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| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 1 years from the accident [1] The most dangerous date in the province, and half the general period: an action «by an insured against the corporation in respect of benefits, insurance money or indemnification payable under the plan must be commenced within one year after the happening of the loss or damage or after the cause of action arose, or as the regulations may provide in the case of any coverage, but not afterwards» (Insurance (Vehicle) Act, s. 17). Do not read the Limitation Act’s two years into a claim against ICBC on the plan. The optional contract is different: its own statutory condition gives two years from the occurrence (Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation, Schedule, condition 8(3)). |
| Regulator | BC Financial Services Authority (BCFSA) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in British Columbia →
| Shared-fault rule | Not yet verified |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [1] |
| Regulator | California Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in California →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence «La apreciación del daño está sujeta a reducción, si el que lo ha sufrido se expuso a él imprudentemente» — the award is reduced where the victim imprudently exposed themselves to the harm (Código Civil art. 2330). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 4 years from the accident [1] |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 4 years from the claim [2] Actions arising from the insurance contract prescribe in four years from when the obligation became enforceable; the period running against the insured is interrupted by the notice of loss and restarts when the insurer communicates its decision (Código de Comercio art. 541). |
| Regulator | Comisión para el Mercado Financiero (CMF) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Chile →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence «La apreciación del daño está sujeta a reducción, si el que lo ha sufrido se expuso a él imprudentemente» — the award is reduced where the victim imprudently exposed themselves to the harm (Código Civil art. 2357); no threshold bars recovery. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [1] Same three-year rule of art. 2358 for the civil action against third parties responsible. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from when the damage became known [2] Ordinary prescription of insurance-contract actions: two years from when the interested party knew or should have known the fact giving rise to the action; extraordinary prescription five years from when the right arose, against everyone (Código de Comercio art. 1081). |
| Regulator | Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Colombia →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) Colorado bars at exactly half. Recovery survives only «if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought», and where the claimant’s proportion «is equal to or greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, then, in such event, the court shall enter a judgment for the defendant» (C.R.S. § 13-21-111(1), (3)). A claimant found exactly 50 % responsible recovers nothing. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] The same paragraph, the same three years, running «after the cause of action accrues» — the section fixes no accrual rule, and in a crash accrual and the collision normally coincide (C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [2] Contract actions also run three years in Colorado (C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(a)), so the action on the policy is no longer than the action on the crash; § 13-80-103.5 carves out certain instruments and was not read, and the section fixes no accrual rule. Uninsured and underinsured motorist claims have their own section: three years from accrual, extendable to «two years after the insured knows that the particular tortfeasor is not covered by any applicable insurance» where the underlying action was brought in time, and «in no event shall the insured have less than three years» (§ 13-80-107.5(1)). |
| Regulator | Colorado Division of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Colorado →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Contributory negligence «shall not bar recovery … if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought», settled or released persons included, and damages «shall be diminished in the proportion of the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering» (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572h(b)). The comparison is against everyone sued added together, not against any one defendant, and a claimant at exactly 50 % still recovers half. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [4] The same § 52-584, and it is the section to rely on: Connecticut’s general tort period is three years from the act (§ 52-577), but the compilation’s own cross-reference sends a negligence claim for injury to person or property to § 52-584’s two years. Publishing three would cost a claimant the case. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [1] A statutory floor on the policy’s own clock, and it is longer than the claim against the other driver: no insurer «may limit the time within which any suit may be brought against it or any demand for arbitration on a claim may be made on the uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability insurance policy to a period of less than three years from the date of accident» (§ 38a-336(g)(1)). The period can be tolled only by doing both of two things — written notice to the insurer before it expires, and suit or arbitration «not more than one hundred eighty days from the date of exhaustion» of the other driver’s limits. An action on the policy as a written contract runs six years from accrual (§ 52-576(a)); whether a Connecticut motor policy may contract for a shorter period on a claim other than uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | Connecticut Insurance Department |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Connecticut →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Delaware’s comparative statute is one sentence and the bar bites only ABOVE the defendant’s share: «In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence which results in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been contributorily negligent shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff … where such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the defendant or the combined negligence of all defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff» (§ 8132, from 64 Del. Laws, c. 384, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1). «Not greater than» is the 51 % form, so A CRASH APPORTIONED FIFTY-FIFTY IN DELAWARE STILL RECOVERS HALF — the same shape as Iowa, West Virginia and Hawaii, and the opposite of Kansas and Nebraska, where an equal share recovers nothing. Note the denominator: the comparison is against «the combined negligence of all defendants against whom recovery is sought», not against each defendant separately, which changes the outcome in a multi-defendant crash and which no summary states. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years for bodily injury, and the accrual wording is unusually blunt: «No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged personal injuries shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained; subject, however, to the provisions of § 8127 of this title» (§ 8119, history «20 Del. Laws, c. 594, § 1; Code 1915, § 4675; Code 1935, § 5133; 10 Del. C. 1953, § 8118; 52 Del. Laws, c. 339, § 2; 57 Del. Laws, c. 568, § 3»). THE CLOCK RUNS FROM THE DATE THE INJURIES ARE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED — not from discovery — so Period.from «accident» is right for Delaware injury claims in a way it is not for every state in this dataset. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years on the policy, as «an action based on a promise»: «No action to recover damages for trespass, … no action based on a promise, no action based on a statute, and no action to recover damages caused by an injury unaccompanied with force or resulting indirectly from the act of the defendant shall be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such action; subject, however, to the provisions of §§ 8108-8110, 8119 and 8127 of this title» (§ 8106(a)). One year longer than either tort clock — the same inversion Alaska has. A FLOOR ON A POLICY SUIT CLAUSE EXISTS IN DELAWARE, BUT ITS REACH TO A MOTOR POLICY IS NOT ESTABLISHED AND IS NOT CLAIMED HERE: § 8106(b) provides that «a property insurance contract subject to subchapter III of Chapter 41 of Title 18: (1) May not require that an action for a claim made under the contract be filed less than 1 year from the date of the denial of the claim by the insurer», an unusually claimant-friendly anchor because it runs from the DENIAL rather than from the loss — but whether a private passenger motor policy is such a contract turns on a subchapter that was not read, and that has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | Delaware Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Delaware →
| Shared-fault rule | Not yet verified |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 6 months from the accident [1] Same six-month rule for the civil action against the responsible driver; time during which the action is legally impossible to bring is not counted. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [2] Extinctive prescription from the date of the loss for any action against the insurer: two years for the insured or beneficiaries, three years for third parties (Ley 146-02 art. 47). |
| Regulator | Superintendencia de Seguros de la República Dominicana |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Dominican Republic →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Contributory negligence: damages are reduced «to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage» (Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s. 1(1)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from when the damage became known [2] Three years from the date the cause of action accrued or, if later, the injured person’s date of knowledge (Limitation Act 1980, s. 11(4)). |
| Regulator | Financial Conduct Authority (conduct) · Financial Ombudsman Service (complaints) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in England and Wales →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) In a negligence action «any party found to be greater than 50 percent at fault for his or her own harm may not recover any damages»; below that, damages are reduced in proportion (Fla. Stat. § 768.81(2), (6), as amended by ch. 2023-15). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [3] «(5) WITHIN TWO YEARS.— (a) An action founded on negligence.» (§ 95.11(5)(a), as amended by ch. 2023-15). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 5 years from the accident [3] A legal or equitable action on a contract founded on a written instrument: five years (§ 95.11(2)(b)). |
| Regulator | Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (regulation) · Department of Financial Services, Division of Consumer Services (complaints) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Florida →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Past the tort threshold, shared fault is handled by a 1969 statute that has not been amended since 1976: «Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person … to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person or in the case of more than one person, the aggregate negligence of such persons against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made» (§ 663-31(a)). «Not greater than» is the 51 % form, so a crash apportioned fifty-fifty still recovers half, and the comparison is against the AGGREGATE negligence of everyone sued rather than against each defendant. The mechanics are prescribed as well as the rule: in a jury trial the jury «shall return a special verdict» stating the damages that would have been recoverable absent contributory negligence and «the degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage»; the court then reduces the award proportionally, and enters judgment for the defendant where the claimant’s proportion is greater than the aggregate negligence of those sued (§ 663-31(b)–(c)). «The court shall instruct the jury regarding the law of comparative negligence where appropriate» (§ 663-31(d)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] The same «later of» rule of § 431:10C-315(b) governs the injury claim, and it is on the injury side that it bites hardest: two years after the accident, OR two years after the last payment of motor-vehicle insurance or optional additional benefits, OR two years after the last payment of workers’ compensation or public assistance benefits arising from the accident — whichever is latest. Hawaii’s tort action is in any event only available past the § 431:10C-306(b) threshold. The general two-year rule of § 657-7 runs «after the cause of action accrued» and supplies the length rather than the trigger. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years on a FIVE-LIMBED «later of», and it is the most claimant-friendly first-party limitation structure in this dataset: «No suit shall be brought on any contract providing motor vehicle insurance benefits or any contract providing optional additional coverage more than the later of: (1) Two years from the date of the motor vehicle accident upon which the claim is based; (2) Two years after the last payment of motor vehicle insurance benefits; (3) Two years after the entry of a final order in arbitration; (4) Two years after the entry of a final judgment in, or dismissal with prejudice of, a tort action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, where a cause of action for insurer bad faith arises out of the tort action; or (5) Two years after payment of liability coverage, for underinsured motorist claims» (§ 431:10C-315(a)). The fifth limb is the one a reader needs: a Hawaii underinsured-motorist claim’s clock starts when the at-fault driver’s insurer pays, not when the crash happened. |
| Regulator | Hawaii Insurance Division, Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Hawaii →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) Idaho’s bar bites at equality, not above it: «Contributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person … to recover damages for negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence or comparative responsibility was NOT AS GREAT AS the negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to the person recovering» (§ 6-801). «Not as great as» is the 50 % form in this dataset’s convention, so A CRASH APPORTIONED FIFTY-FIFTY IN IDAHO RECOVERS NOTHING. BUT THE PERCENTAGE ALONE IS MISLEADING, AND § 6-803(3) IS THE SENTENCE A SUMMARY ALWAYS DROPS. Note first that § 6-801 compares the claimant against «the person against whom recovery is sought», singular. Section 6-803(3) then says how that is done: «The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of action listed in subsection (5) of this section. In any action in which the trier of fact attributes the percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility to persons listed on a special verdict, the court shall enter a separate judgment against each party whose negligence or comparative responsibility exceeds the negligence or comparative responsibility attributed to the person recovering. The negligence or comparative responsibility of each such party is to be compared INDIVIDUALLY to the negligence or comparative responsibility of the person recovering», and judgment against each is «in an amount equal to each party’s proportionate share». So a claimant 30 % at fault against two defendants at 35 % each recovers from both, while A CLAIMANT 40 % AT FAULT AGAINST TWO DEFENDANTS AT 30 % EACH RECOVERS FROM NEITHER — even though the defendants together were more at fault than the claimant. Joint and several liability survives only «where they were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of another party», and «acting in concert» means «pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortious act» (§ 6-803(5)). The apportioning special verdict is discretionary for the court but mandatory once asked for: the court «may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts», and the reduction is then the court’s arithmetic duty rather than the jury’s (§ 6-802) — a softer rule than Hawaii’s § 663-31(b), which requires the special verdict outright. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years, and THE ACCRUAL SENTENCE IS THE OPERATIVE ONE FOR A CRASH VICTIM: «Actions against officers, for penalties, on bonds, and for professional malpractice or for personal injuries. Within two (2) years: … 4. An action to recover damages for professional malpractice, or for an injury to the person, or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another … but in all other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, THE CAUSE OF ACTION SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE ACCRUED AS OF THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE, ACT OR OMISSION COMPLAINED OF, AND THE LIMITATION PERIOD SHALL NOT BE EXTENDED BY REASON OF ANY CONTINUING CONSEQUENCES OR DAMAGES RESULTING THEREFROM» (§ 5-219(4)). Idaho says this in terms rather than leaving it to case law, so the clock runs from the crash and a worsening injury does not restart it. NO DISCOVERY RULE IS PUBLISHED FOR IDAHO BODILY INJURY: the discovery exceptions in the same paragraph are confined to a retained foreign object and to fraudulent concealment by a wrongdoer in a professional or commercial relationship, and neither reaches an ordinary collision. Note too the contrast with Vermont, whose § 512(4) attaches its three years to «the date of the discovery of the injury» on the face of the statute — the two states differ on the trigger as well as the length. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 5 years from the accident [4] Five years to sue on the policy, which is an instrument in writing: «Action on written contract. Within five (5) years: An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing» (§ 5-216). TWO CAVEATS TRAVEL WITH THE FIGURE RATHER THAN BEING CONCEALED. No Idaho statute read for this row fixes a shorter period for a first-party motor claim, and THE POLICY’S OWN SUIT-LIMITATION CONDITION WAS NOT EXAMINED, so a contractual clause may cut this down. And § 41-1839 is not an answer to the question: it supplies a thirty-day payment clock with a fee-shifting consequence, not a limitation period. |
| Regulator | Idaho Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Idaho →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) The plaintiff is barred «if the trier of fact finds that the contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause»; otherwise damages are «diminished in the proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff» (735 ILCS 5/2-1116). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [1] «Actions for damages for an injury to the person … shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of action accrued» (735 ILCS 5/13-202). |
| Regulator | Illinois Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Illinois →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Contributory fault «diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages … but does not bar recovery except as provided in section 6», and section 6 bars the claim where the claimant’s fault «is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages» (Ind. Code §§ 34-51-2-5, 34-51-2-6). The jury instruction puts it in figures — above 50 % the claim fails, at exactly 50 % the claimant recovers half (§ 34-51-2-8(b)(2)–(3)) — and the comparison includes nonparties, so a share allocated to somebody who was never sued still counts against the claimant. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] The same § 34-11-2-4(a), and only its subsection (a): subsections (b) to (d) are a child-sexual-abuse extension and have nothing to do with a motor claim. |
| Regulator | Indiana Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Indiana →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Reduction, not a bar, until the claimant carries more than everyone else put together: «Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by a claimant to recover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or property unless the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defendants, third-party defendants and persons who have been released pursuant to section 668.7, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the claimant» (§ 668.3(1)(a)). «Greater than» is the 51 % form, so a driver exactly half to blame still recovers half — the opposite of Kansas and Nebraska next door. The comparison is against the combined fault of all the defendants and released parties, not against each of them separately. A consortium claim is measured differently again: it is barred by the fault of the injured person, not of the family member bringing it (§ 668.3(1)(b)). Do not confuse either rule with § 668.4, which is a separate fifty-percent rule about joint and several liability among defendants. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years from accrual for «those founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty» (§ 614.1(2)). Read the words «whether based on contract or tort»: recasting an injury claim as a contract claim does not buy the ten years of § 614.1(5)(a). This is the shortest of Iowa’s three periods and the one that governs the claim most readers are making. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 10 years from the accident [2] Ten years for actions «founded on written contracts» (§ 614.1(5)(a)) — the policy itself. Two cautions travel with it. The policy may contract for a shorter suit-against-us period, and whether any Iowa statute sets a floor on how short that clause may be has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. And § 614.1(2) reaches an injury claim «whether based on contract or tort», so the ten years is a contract period and not a way round the two. |
| Regulator | Iowa Insurance Division |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Iowa →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) Kansas is one of the strict states, and the wording is what makes it strict: «The contributory negligence of a party in a civil action does not bar that party or its legal representative from recovering damages for negligence resulting in death, personal injury, property damage or economic loss, if that party’s negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or parties against whom a claim is made, but the award of damages to that party must be reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to that party» (§ 60-258a(a)). «Less than» is the 50 % form: A CRASH APPORTIONED EXACTLY FIFTY-FIFTY RECOVERS NOTHING IN KANSAS — the opposite of Iowa, which sits on the other side of the same round with a «greater than» bar. In a wrongful-death claim the decedent’s own negligence is imputed to the person claiming. Joint and several liability does not survive a comparative-negligence case: «each party is liable for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to a claimant in the proportion that the amount of that party’s causal negligence bears to the amount of the causal negligence attributed to all parties» (§ 60-258a(d)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [2] Two years under the residual limb of the same section — «an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated» (§ 60-513(a)(4)) — on the same substantial-injury accrual rule and the same ten-year statute of repose (§ 60-513(b)). A far shorter clock than either of these governs the no-fault side of a Kansas claim, and it is easy to miss: «No claim for personal injury protection benefits may be made after two (2) years from the date of the injury» (§ 40-3110(a)). The Revisor’s own annotation to that section records it as a claim-submission deadline rather than a limitation on suit, citing Patterson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 31 Kan. App. 2d 919, 75 P.3d 763 (2003); the annotation was read, the opinion was not, so the distinction is attributed to the annotation and not stated as settled. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 5 years from the accident [2] Five years on «an action upon any agreement, contract or promise in writing» (§ 60-511(1)) — the policy itself. It does not rescue a PIP claim: the two-year claim deadline of § 40-3110(a) bites first and on its own terms, whatever the policy’s contract period. Whether any Kansas statute sets a floor on how short a motor policy’s own suit-against-us clause may be has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | Kansas Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Kansas →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence KRS 411.182 apportions fault into «each party’s equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault», weighing both the nature of each party’s conduct and the extent of the causal relation between that conduct and the damages. Subsections (1) to (4) were read end to end and contain no percentage threshold, no bar and no «greater than fifty percent» clause, so nothing defeats a claimant at any percentage. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [4] The trigger is unusual and no generic description of it is safe: two years «after the injury, or the death, or the date of issuance of the last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later occurs» (KRS 304.39-230(6)). A claimant drawing reparation benefits for eighteen months therefore has a clock that starts at the last payment, not at the collision. A 2017 amendment added that a reissued «replacement payment» does not extend the date, and that a claimant may ask the obligor in writing whether a payment was one. Cite this section and not KRS 413.140, whose general personal-injury period is one year and does not govern a motor claim. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from when the damage became known [4] Where no reparation benefits have been paid: two years after the injured person suffers the loss and knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that it was caused by the accident — «or not later than four (4) years after the accident, whichever is earlier», so the discovery rule is capped by an absolute four-year bar. Where benefits have been paid, the period is two years from the last payment (KRS 304.39-230(1)). Survivor’s benefits are shorter still: one year after the death or four years after the accident, whichever is earlier (KRS 304.39-230(2)). Legal disability does not toll any of these — the statute expressly counts the period of disability inside the limit (KRS 304.39-230(5)). The general written-contract period for a modern Kentucky policy is ten years under KRS 413.160, but KRS 304.39-230(1) displaces it for reparation benefits. |
| Regulator | Kentucky Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Kentucky →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) From 1 January 2026 a claimant whose own negligence is «equal to or greater than fifty-one percent» recovers nothing, and below that the award is reduced in proportion (C.C. art. 2323(A)(2)(a)–(b), as amended by Acts 2025, No. 15, eff. 1 Jan. 2026). The bar sits at 51 %, not at «greater than 50 %»: a claimant exactly 51 % at fault recovers nothing, one at 50.9 % recovers 49.1 %. Louisiana was a pure comparative-fault state from 1979 until 31 December 2025, and the act’s own title says it is passed «to establish a modified comparative fault system». Whether the 51 % bar reaches accidents before 1 January 2026 has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here — the act fixes an effective date and says nothing else. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [4] The same article and the same limit: two years from the day injury or damage is sustained (C.C. art. 3493.1), and the same prospectivity rule — the two years apply only to crashes on or after 1 July 2024, because Acts 2024, No. 423, § 3 gives the act «prospective application only». Louisiana’s famous one-year delictual prescription is gone: art. 3492 now reads «Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, §2, eff. July 1, 2024», and art. 3493 was repealed by the same section. Any page still saying one year is describing pre-July-2024 law. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 10 years from the accident [4] An action on the policy is a personal action, so the residual ten-year prescription of C.C. art. 3499 applies «unless otherwise provided by legislation». That is the ceiling, not the operative deadline: the policy’s own suit clause is what usually bites, and La. R.S. 22:868(B) only sets a floor on it — no less than twenty-four months from the inception of the loss for a first-party claim in the classes of insurance it enumerates by cross-reference to R.S. 22:47, and no less than one year from accrual for all other insurance, with any shorter condition void. Those enumerated classes were not read, so which floor reaches a private passenger auto policy has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. Filing against the driver protects the insurers too: R.S. 22:1269(B)(3) makes that filing interrupt prescription as to every insurer covering the claim. |
| Regulator | Louisiana Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Louisiana →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) MAINE’S SHARED-FAULT RULE IS UNLIKE ANY OTHER IN THIS DATASET AND MUST NOT BE FLATTENED INTO A PERCENTAGE — THE LABEL «modified-50» CARRIES THE BAR AND NOTHING ELSE, BECAUSE THE STATUTE PROMISES NO PROPORTIONAL ARITHMETIC AT ALL. «When any person suffers death or damage as a result partly of that person’s own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that death or damage MAY NOT BE DEFEATED BY REASON OF THE FAULT OF THE PERSON SUFFERING THE DAMAGE, BUT THE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN RESPECT THEREOF MUST BE REDUCED TO SUCH EXTENT AS THE JURY THINKS JUST AND EQUITABLE HAVING REGARD TO THE CLAIMANT’S SHARE IN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DAMAGE. … the court shall instruct the jury to find and record the total damages that would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault, AND FURTHER INSTRUCT THE JURY TO REDUCE THE TOTAL DAMAGES BY DOLLARS AND CENTS, AND NOT BY PERCENTAGE, to the extent considered just and equitable …, and instruct the jury to return both amounts WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE LESSER FIGURE IS THE FINAL VERDICT in the case. … “Fault” means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission that gives rise to a liability in tort … IF SUCH CLAIMANT IS FOUND BY THE JURY TO BE EQUALLY AT FAULT, THE CLAIMANT MAY NOT RECOVER» (14 M.R.S. § 156). So TWO THINGS ARE TRUE AT ONCE AND BOTH MATTER. The bar is at equality — a claimant found EQUALLY at fault recovers nothing, so a fifty-fifty crash in Maine recovers nothing, the same outcome as Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska and North Dakota. But between zero and equal fault the reduction is whatever the jury thinks just and equitable, expressed IN DOLLARS AND CENTS AND EXPRESSLY NOT AS A PERCENTAGE, with the jury returning the gross figure and the reduced figure and the lesser one entering as the verdict. A READER TOLD «MAINE IS MODIFIED COMPARATIVE AT 50 %» WILL EXPECT A CLAIMANT 30 % AT FAULT TO LOSE EXACTLY 30 %, AND MAINE’S STATUTE DOES NOT PROMISE THAT. The multi-defendant rule points the opposite way from Idaho’s: «In a case involving multiparty defendants, EACH DEFENDANT IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE PLAINTIFF’S DAMAGES. However, any defendant has the right through the use of special interrogatories to request of the jury the percentage of fault contributed by each defendant.» So Maine keeps joint and several liability in full — a solvent defendant can be made to pay everything — and percentages between defendants are found only if a defendant asks for them, where Idaho’s § 6-803(3) abolishes joint liability outside concert and agency. The price is the settlement machinery: releasing one defendant under an agreement that precludes collecting its share entitles it to be «dismissed with prejudice», bars contribution claims against it, and leaves the remaining parties to conduct discovery and invoke the evidentiary rules «as if the released and dismissed defendant were still a party» (§ 156(1)–(2)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 6 years from the accident [2] The SAME six years of 14 M.R.S. § 752, published separately only because the field requires it: one sentence covers the bodily-injury claim, the vehicle-damage claim and the action on the policy, all running «after the cause of action accrues». Maine names no «personal injury» period of its own, which is why the injury claim arrives through the general civil-actions rule rather than through a section that mentions injuries. THE SAME «EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIALLY PROVIDED» SAVING APPLIES AND WAS NOT CLOSED, so the six years must never be described as though nothing in Maine law could shorten them. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [2] The same six years again: the action on the policy is a civil action under 14 M.R.S. § 752, and no shorter first-party period was found in anything read for this row. THE POLICY’S OWN SUIT-LIMITATION CONDITION WAS NOT EXAMINED. Note what Maine gives the insured instead of a shorter clock — a statutory first-party cause of action against their own insurer under 24-A M.R.S. § 2436-A, carrying damages, costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and interest at 1.5 % a month, whose own limitation period was not separately fixed by anything read here. |
| Regulator | Maine Bureau of Insurance, Department of Professional and Financial Regulation |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Maine →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Contributory negligence «is not a bar to the recovery of damages», and where the plaintiff’s negligence contributed «the court shall apportion the damages in proportion to the degree of negligence found against the plaintiff and defendant respectively» (Tortfeasors and Contributory Negligence Act, s. 4); where apportionment is not practicable the parties «shall be deemed equally negligent» (s. 6). Because injury actions are abolished, the rule does its work on property damage. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [1] This is a claim deadline, not a limitation period for a lawsuit: there is no injury action to commence. A claim for compensation must be made «within two years after the day of the accident» or, where symptoms not apparent immediately after the accident are observed by a practitioner within those two years, within two years of that first observation (MPIC Act, s. 141(1)); a death claim runs two years from the death (s. 141(2)) and a claimant who was a minor has two years from turning eighteen (s. 141(3)). MPI «may waive a time limit» where satisfied there was a reasonable excuse — a discretion, not a right (s. 141(5)). |
| Regulator | Manitoba Public Insurance (MPI) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Manitoba →
| Shared-fault rule | Contributory negligence Maryland keeps the common-law contributory-negligence bar, and there is no percentage to publish: a claimant the fact-finder finds negligent recovers nothing, with no apportionment. The Court of Appeals declined to abandon the doctrine in 2013 — «although this Court has the authority to change the common law rule of contributory negligence, we decline to abrogate Maryland’s long-established common law principle of contributory negligence» — and described the effect in the case before it: «Because of the contributory negligence finding, Coleman was barred from any recovery» (Coleman v. Soccer Association of Columbia, 432 Md. 679 (2013)). One statutory carve-out matters in a motor claim: failure to wear a seat belt may not «be considered evidence of contributory negligence», may not limit a party’s or an insurer’s liability, and may not be referred to at trial (Transportation § 22-412.3(h)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [1] The same § 5-101 and the same three years for the injury claim as for the car. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [1] The same three years, as a contract action under Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5-101. Whether a Maryland motor policy may contract for less has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here: twenty sections of the Insurance Article and the limitations section were read without finding a provision voiding or flooring such a clause, and that finding is bounded to the sections read. The one statutory floor located in the Maryland material is on claim filing rather than suit — a policy may set a period of «not less than 12 months» after the accident within which the original first-party benefits claim must be filed, and the insurer must write and tell the insured the latest date on which a claim may be filed (Insurance § 19-508(a)(2)(i), (b)(1)). |
| Regulator | Maryland Insurance Administration |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Maryland →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Contributory negligence «shall not bar recovery … if such negligence was not greater than the total amount of negligence attributable to the person or persons against whom recovery is sought», and damages are «diminished in proportion» to it; assumption of risk is abolished and the claimant «shall be presumed to have been in the exercise of due care» (M.G.L. c. 231, § 85). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [5] Three years under M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A, and confirmed by § 4, which names «actions of tort for bodily injuries or for death the payment of judgments in which is required to be secured by chapter ninety» at the same three years — so the two sections agree and no tie-break is needed. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [5] General contract period: «Actions of contract, other than those to recover for personal injuries … shall … be commenced only within six years» (M.G.L. c. 260, § 2) — the route § 34M gives an unpaid personal injury protection claimant. A motor policy commonly carries a shorter suit clause of its own, and no Massachusetts provision governing such clauses was read for this page, so six years is not the practical deadline. Separately, the claimant must present the PIP claim to the insurer within two years of the accident (c. 90, § 34M). |
| Regulator | Massachusetts Division of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Massachusetts →
| Shared-fault rule | Not yet verified Not settled on the texts read. The only shared-fault provision in the federal civil code is an all-or-nothing defence: the defendant escapes liability by proving the harm followed from «culpa o negligencia inexcusable de la víctima» (Código Civil Federal arts. 1910 and 1913), which is a complete answer and not a percentage reduction. Ordinary crash liability is in any case governed by the 32 state civil codes, because the federal code applies only to federal matters (art. 1º); whether a state court reduces an award for a victim’s ordinary negligence has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [4] Same two-year rule of art. 1934 for injury, with the same federal-only caveat. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [1] Actions deriving from an insurance contract prescribe in two years, counted from the event that gave rise to them (Ley sobre el Contrato de Seguro art. 81 fr. II; five years for death cover in life insurance). Where the loss itself is concerned the period runs from the day the interested parties learned of it, which they must prove (art. 82), and no clause may shorten or lengthen it (art. 83). |
| Regulator | CONDUSEF — Comisión Nacional para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios Financieros |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Mexico →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Damages are reduced by the claimant’s share of fault, and where that share «is greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons» the court «shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative fault … and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded» (MCL 600.2959) — so only noneconomic damages are barred, and economic damages survive pro rata. Inside the no-fault chapter itself, «damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault», and none are assessed in favour of a party driving without the statutory security (MCL 500.3135(2)(b)–(c)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [3] Three years after the time of the death or injury, the same period the statute gives to property claims (MCL 600.5805(1)–(2)); the capture read is complete through Public Act 149 of 2024. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 1 years from the accident [4] An action for personal protection insurance benefits «may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident that caused the injury unless written notice of injury … has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment» (MCL 500.3145(1)); where notice was given or a payment made, the action runs one year from the most recent loss incurred, and «the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced» (§ 500.3145(2)). The clock is tolled from a specific claim until the insurer formally denies it, and only if the claim is pursued with reasonable diligence (§ 500.3145(3)); property protection benefits carry a flat year from the accident (§ 500.3145(5)). Other contract claims on the policy run six years (MCL 600.5807(9)), and a personal auto policy may not shorten any of these — a shortened limitation of action clause is forbidden and void (Mich. Admin. Code R 500.2212(2)–(3)). |
| Regulator | Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services (DIFS) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Michigan →
| Shared-fault rule | Not yet verified Missouri’s shared-fault rule for an ordinary collision is judge-made, and it is not published as a value here. § 537.765, often cited for it, abolishes the contributory-fault bar and applies «the doctrine of pure comparative fault» expressly and only «in a products liability claim», so it does not reach a crash. Federal opinions published by the Government Publishing Office characterise Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) as having adopted pure comparative fault, but the Missouri Supreme Court’s own text could not be read and that characterisation is not a verified reading of it. What statute does fix is the defendants’ side: in all tort actions a defendant at fifty-one percent or more of the fault is jointly and severally liable for the whole judgment, and one below that share pays only its own percentage (§ 537.067.1) — a rule about defendants, not a bar on the claimant. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 5 years from when the damage became known [2] The same five years and the same subdivision as the vehicle claim, so there is no shorter injury clock to miss (§ 516.120(4), RSMo), running from when the damage «is sustained and is capable of ascertainment» (§ 516.100). |
| Regulator | Missouri Department of Commerce and Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Missouri →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Montana’s bar bites only ABOVE fifty per cent, and the section carries TWO texts, each labelled by the publisher, of which the operative one is the one marked «(Temporary)». «27-1-702. (Temporary) Comparative negligence — extent to which contributory negligence bars recovery in action for damages. Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by a person … to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to the person or property IF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT GREATER THAN THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PERSON OR THE COMBINED NEGLIGENCE OF ALL PERSONS AGAINST WHOM RECOVERY IS SOUGHT, but any damages allowed MUST BE DIMINISHED IN THE PROPORTION TO THE PERCENTAGE OF NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PERSON RECOVERING. (Terminates on occurrence of contingency--sec. 11(2), Ch. 429, L. 1997.)» «Not greater than» is the 51 % form in this dataset’s convention, so A CRASH APPORTIONED FIFTY-FIFTY IN MONTANA RECOVERS HALF — the same camp as Iowa, West Virginia, Hawaii, Vermont and Wyoming, and the opposite of Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Maine and North Dakota. Note also that the denominator is the COMBINED negligence of all the persons sued, which helps a claimant facing several defendants, and that the reduction here IS proportional and by percentage — unlike Maine’s § 156, which forbids a percentage reduction. TWO THINGS ABOUT THE LABELS MUST BE GOT RIGHT AND NEITHER MAY BE AVERAGED AWAY. FIRST, «TEMPORARY» DOES NOT MEAN SHORT-LIVED: this text terminates only on a contingency fixed by section 11(2) of chapter 429 of the Laws of 1997, and that contingency has not occurred — so the «(Temporary)» text is the law, and a secondary description will quote whichever of the two it happens to have copied. SECOND, THE CONTINGENT SUCCESSOR TEXT WOULD CHANGE THE DENOMINATOR AND COULD DEFEAT A CLAIMANT THE PRESENT TEXT ALLOWS TO RECOVER: «27-1-702. (Effective on occurrence of contingency) Comparative fault … if the contributory fault was not greater than the fault of the defendant OR THE COMBINED FAULT OF ALL DEFENDANTS AND NONPARTIES» — adding non-parties to the comparison, which is materially wider. The contingency itself was not opened, so what is published is the operative text with the pending alternative disclosed beside it. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [3] Three years, and Montana routes a personal-injury claim through the residual paragraph rather than through a section that names it: «27-2-204. (Temporary) Tort actions — general and personal injury. (1) Except as provided in 27-2-216, the period prescribed for the commencement of AN ACTION UPON A LIABILITY NOT FOUNDED UPON AN INSTRUMENT IN WRITING is within 3 years.» Subsection (2) gives three years for a death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, «except when the wrongful death is the result of a homicide, in which case the period is within 10 years»; subsection (3) gives two years for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction, so the three years are the NEGLIGENCE period specifically. THIS SECTION TOO CARRIES TWO LABELLED TEXTS AND THE FIGURE IS SAFE EITHER WAY: the text «(Effective October 1, 2026)» keeps the same three years and changes only the list of cross-referenced exceptions, adding § 27-2-219 beside § 27-2-216 (history line «amd. Sec. 4, Ch. 709, L. 2025»). SO THE FIGURE IS PUBLISHED AND THE EXCEPTIONS ARE NOT: neither § 27-2-216 nor § 27-2-219 was opened, so whether either reaches a motor-vehicle injury claim has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the denial [5] TWO YEARS, NOT SIX, AND PUBLISHING SIX ALONE WOULD BE ACTIVELY MISLEADING. Montana’s operative deadline for a claim-handling action is its own: «The period prescribed for commencement of an action under this section is: (a) for an insured, WITHIN 2 YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE VIOLATION OF 33-18-201; and (b) for a third-party claimant, WITHIN 1 YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE SETTLEMENT OF OR THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON THE UNDERLYING CLAIM» (§ 33-18-242(8)). Two years for the insured is the shortest first-party clock on any row in this dataset, and the third-party claimant’s ONE year is shorter still. A NOTE ON THE TRIGGER, BECAUSE THIS DATASET HAS NO ENUM VALUE FOR IT: the statute runs from «the date of the violation of 33-18-201», which is neither the accident, nor the filing of the claim, nor strictly a denial; the nearest available value is used and the statute’s own words are given here so nothing is hidden — the clock starts when the insurer commits the practice complained of, which in most cases is a refusal or a failure to settle. THE SEPARATE CONTRACT ROUTE IS SIX YEARS AND IS NAMED BESIDE THIS ONE RATHER THAN INSTEAD OF IT: «the period prescribed for the commencement of an action on any contract, covenant, obligation, or liability founded on an instrument in writing is within 6 years» (§ 27-2-202(1)), with five years where it is not founded on a writing and three on a non-contractual obligation. A claimant who assumes six years for everything against an insurer will be out of time on the statutory route. |
| Regulator | Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Montana →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) Nebraska reaches Kansas’s strict result through different words: «Any contributory negligence chargeable to the claimant shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as damages for an injury attributable to the claimant’s contributory negligence but shall not bar recovery, except that if the contributory negligence of the claimant is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought, the claimant shall be totally barred from recovery» (§ 25-21,185.09). «Equal to or greater than» is the 50 % form: A CRASH APPORTIONED EXACTLY FIFTY-FIFTY RECOVERS NOTHING IN NEBRASKA, and the comparison is against the TOTAL negligence of everyone sued, not against each defendant. The same section gives a procedural right worth knowing: «The jury shall be instructed on the effects of the allocation of negligence.» One regulation exists because the bar is otherwise a bargaining weapon: «Insurers shall not assign a percentage of negligence to a claimant for the purpose of reducing a settlement, when there exists no reasonable evidence upon which the assigned percentage of negligence could be based» (210 Neb. Admin. Code ch. 60, § 008.06) — found in no other state’s claims rule in this dataset. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 4 years from the accident [2] Four years for «an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated» (§ 25-207(3)) — twice the two years Kansas allows immediately to the south, on materially the same claim. The section reaches trespass, conversion, other torts and frauds and states its own four-year limit in its opening sentence. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 5 years from the accident [2] Five years on «a specialty, or any agreement, contract, or promise in writing, or foreign judgment» (§ 25-205(1)) — the policy itself. Subsection (2), the stated exception, is a farm-collateral carve-out and does not reach a motor policy. Whether any Nebraska statute sets a floor on how short a motor policy’s own suit-against-us clause may be has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | Nebraska Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Nebraska →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) A claimant’s comparative negligence «does not bar a recovery if that negligence was not greater than the negligence or gross negligence of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought» (NRS 41.141(1)), and where several defendants are sued the comparison is against their combined negligence (NRS 41.141(2)(a)). So a fifty-fifty crash still recovers half. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [3] «Within 2 years: … an action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another» (NRS 11.190(4)(e)). The same two years cover a death claim. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [3] Six years on «an action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing» (NRS 11.190(1)(b)). This is the residual, not the operative deadline: the policy’s own suit-limitation clause may be shorter, and whether any Nevada instrument sets a floor on such a clause is not stated here — NRS chapter 687B was searched and contains none, but that is one chapter of Title 57 and not the whole title. |
| Regulator | Nevada Division of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Nevada →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Shared fault reduces a New Brunswick award; it never extinguishes it. «Where by the fault of two or more persons damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, the liability to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault but if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally», and nothing in that section operates «so as to render any person liable for any damage or loss to which his fault has not contributed» (Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-19, s. 1(1)–(2)). No percentage bars recovery. Where two or more persons are found at fault «they are jointly and severally liable to the person suffering the damage or loss», contributing between themselves in proportion to fault (s. 2(2)) — so a claimant may recover the whole reduced award from one of several at-fault drivers. Fault and its degrees are questions of fact (s. 5), and «unless the judge otherwise directs, the liability for costs of the parties shall be in the same proportion as the liability to make good the loss or damage» (s. 7(2)), which is the practical sting of a partial-fault finding. The text read is the publisher’s consolidation to 1 September 2011. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [3] «No claim shall be brought after the earlier of (a) two years from the day on which the claim is discovered, and (b) fifteen years from the day on which the act or omission on which the claim is based occurred», and a claim is discovered when the claimant first knew or ought reasonably to have known that the loss occurred, that it was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission, and that the act or omission was the defendant’s (Limitation of Actions Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. L-8.5, s. 5(1)–(2)). The discovery test has three limbs where neighbouring Nova Scotia’s has four: New Brunswick has no «sufficiently serious to warrant a proceeding» limb, so the clock can start earlier here on identical facts. A continuous act or omission is deemed a separate act or omission on each day it continues (s. 6). Nothing read establishes a New Brunswick analogue of Nova Scotia’s judicial power to disallow a limitation defence, and none is asserted either way. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [1] «Every action or proceeding against the insurer under this contract in respect of loss or damage to the automobile shall be commenced within two years next after the happening of the loss and not afterwards, and in respect of loss or damage to persons or property shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action arose and not afterwards» (Insurance Act, statutory condition 6(3)). The two years published here is the vehicle-damage clock, which runs from the happening of the loss; the clock for loss or damage to persons or property runs instead from when the cause of action arose. Note the divergence from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, whose equivalent condition runs the indemnity clock from the date the insured’s liability is established by a court — the Atlantic provinces share this statutory-conditions text but not its triggers. |
| Regulator | New Brunswick Financial and Consumer Services Commission |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in New Brunswick →
| Shared-fault rule | Not yet verified NEW MEXICO HAS NO COMPARATIVE-FAULT STATUTE, AND THE FIELD IS «UNCLEAR» FOR A SOURCING REASON RATHER THAN A LEGAL ONE. The rule is judge-made. New Mexico is characterised as a pure comparative-negligence state on the authority of Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234, in which the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that comparative negligence «is adopted in this jurisdiction and replaces the “all-or-nothing” rule of contributory negligence» and that «a pure comparative negligence standard shall supersede prior law in New Mexico, and that a plaintiff suing in negligence shall no longer be totally barred from recovery because of his contributory negligence». That opinion was read in full, with its official citation and panel, at nmonesource.com — the New Mexico Compilation Commission’s platform, the state’s official publisher of the appellate reports — but NOT at a court-operated host, and this dataset only records a judge-made comparative rule as verified when the opinion is read at the court’s own site or at GPO. New Mexico’s courts host was unusable: nmcourts.gov and supremecourt.nmcourts.gov both answer a 302 redirect to 127.0.0.1. So the case is named here as CHARACTERISATION and the enum is left «unclear» rather than asserting a value on a locator the rules of this dataset do not accept. What the Legislature does supply corroborates that no percentage bar exists: it speaks only of «any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies» when abolishing joint and several liability, and codifies no threshold (§ 41-3A-1(A)). That abolition matters in its own right — «The liability of any such defendants shall be several», each paying «only for that portion» equal to the ratio of its own fault «to the total fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants and persons not party to the action», so people who are not parties count in the denominator. Four carve-outs restore joint liability, and the fourth is open-ended: intentional injury, vicarious liability, strict product liability, and «situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a sound basis in public policy» (§ 41-3A-1(C)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years, and the section it lives in reads oddly because the injury period is a clause at the end of a provision mostly about surety bonds: «Actions must be brought against sureties on official bonds … within two years after the liability of the principal … is finally established …, and for an injury to the person or reputation of any person, within three years» (§ 37-1-8). The discovery rule of § 37-1-7 is confined by its own words to property and conversion and is not extended here; § 37-1-1 puts this clock at accrual. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [2] Six years for «actions founded upon any bond, promissory note, bill of exchange or other contract in writing» (§ 37-1-3(A)) — the policy itself, and the longest first-party contract period in its round. It does not lengthen the tort clocks, and whether any New Mexico statute sets a floor on how short a motor policy’s own suit-against-us clause may be has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | New Mexico Office of Superintendent of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in New Mexico →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence The claimant’s culpable conduct «shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion» it bears to the conduct that caused the damages (C.P.L.R. § 1411). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] «an action to recover damages for a personal injury» — three years (C.P.L.R. § 214(5)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [2] General period for «an action upon a contractual obligation or liability» (C.P.L.R. § 213(2)); when a first-party no-fault action accrues is governed by case law not read for this page. |
| Regulator | New York State Department of Financial Services |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in New York →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Shared fault reduces a Newfoundland and Labrador award and never bars it. «Where by the fault of 2 or more persons damage or loss is caused to 1 or more of them, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault», and notwithstanding that, «where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally» and «nothing in this section shall operate so as to make a person liable for damage or loss to which his or her fault has not contributed» (Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-33, s. 2(1)–(2)). No percentage of the claimant’s own fault defeats the claim. Where two or more are found at fault «they shall be jointly and individually liable to the person suffering damage or loss» — the Act’s own older phrase for joint and several liability — contributing between themselves in proportion to fault (s. 3). Fault and its degrees are questions of fact (s. 4), and costs follow the apportionment unless the judge directs otherwise, with an express set-off where one party is owed an excess of damages and the other an excess of costs (s. 8). Note the locator: the apportionment rule is s. 2 here, not s. 1 or s. 3 as in the neighbouring provinces. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [2] Two years, and the trigger comes from a second section. On its face s. 5 runs the period from «the date on which the right to do so arose», barring after two years an action «for damages in respect of injury to a person or property, including economic loss arising from the injury whether based on contract, tort or statutory duty» (Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1, s. 5(a)). But for personal injury and property damage the period «does not begin to run against a person until the person knows or, considering all circumstances of the matter, ought to know that the person has a cause of action» (s. 14(1)), so in practice it is a discovery rule — a one-limb formulation against Nova Scotia’s four and New Brunswick’s three. The outer limit is the largest divergence in the region: «no action to which this Act applies shall be brought after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the event which gave rise to the cause of action last occurred» (s. 22) — thirty years, where Nova Scotia and New Brunswick each impose fifteen. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [1] Two years, from two different triggers, and neither is the accident for the indemnity claim. An action against the insurer «in respect of a claim for indemnification for liability to the insured … shall be started within 2 years after the liability of the insured is established by a court and not afterwards», while «all other actions or proceedings against the insurer, under this contract, in respect of loss or damage to the automobile shall be started within 2 years from the time the loss or damage was sustained» (Automobile Insurance Act, statutory condition on limitation of actions). The two years published here is the vehicle-damage clock, which does run from the loss. This follows Nova Scotia rather than New Brunswick, whose equivalent condition runs the indemnity clock from when the cause of action arose — three provinces, a shared statutory text, two different triggers. |
| Regulator | Office of the Superintendent of Insurance, Digital Government and Service NL |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Newfoundland and Labrador →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) North Dakota’s bar bites at equality, and the section is titled for what it does: «32-03.2-02. Modified comparative fault. CONTRIBUTORY FAULT DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY in an action by any person to recover damages for death or injury to person or property UNLESS THE FAULT WAS AS GREAT AS THE COMBINED FAULT OF ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INJURY, but any damages allowed MUST BE DIMINISHED IN PROPORTION TO THE AMOUNT OF CONTRIBUTING FAULT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PERSON RECOVERING. The court may, and WHEN REQUESTED BY ANY PARTY, SHALL direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to EACH PERSON, WHETHER OR NOT A PARTY, who contributed to the injury. … When two or more parties are found to have contributed to the injury, THE LIABILITY OF EACH PARTY IS SEVERAL ONLY, AND IS NOT JOINT, and each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party, EXCEPT THAT ANY PERSONS WHO ACT IN CONCERT … ARE JOINTLY LIABLE … Under this section, FAULT INCLUDES NEGLIGENCE, MALPRACTICE, ABSOLUTE LIABILITY, DRAM SHOP LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN, RECKLESS OR WILLFUL CONDUCT, ASSUMPTION OF RISK, MISUSE OF PRODUCT, FAILURE TO AVOID INJURY, and product liability.» «As great as» is the 50 % form in this dataset’s convention, so A CRASH APPORTIONED FIFTY-FIFTY IN NORTH DAKOTA RECOVERS NOTHING — the same camp as Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska and Maine, and the opposite of Montana, Vermont, Iowa, West Virginia and Hawaii. THREE QUALIFIERS PULL IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS AND ALL THREE BELONG ON THE ROW. The comparison is against the COMBINED fault of all contributors, which HELPS a claimant facing several defendants — unlike Idaho’s § 6-803(3), where each defendant’s fault is compared individually and a claimant can lose against two defendants who together outweigh them. But the jury apportions fault to every person who contributed «WHETHER OR NOT A PARTY», so an absent, unidentified or immune driver’s share enters the denominator; liability between defendants is SEVERAL ONLY outside concerted action, so the claimant carries an insolvent co-defendant’s share; and «fault» is defined expansively enough to reach ASSUMPTION OF RISK and FAILURE TO AVOID INJURY, not negligence alone. AND THERE IS A CARVE-OUT THAT FITS THE ORDINARY FENDER-BENDER EXACTLY AND APPEARS IN NO OTHER JURISDICTION IN THIS DATASET: «32-03.2-02.1. Automobile accident damage liability. NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 32-03.2-02, in an action by any person to recover direct and indirect damages for injury to property, THE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE DIMINISHED IN PROPORTION TO THE AMOUNT OF CONTRIBUTING FAULT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PERSON RECOVERING, OR OTHERWISE, IF: 1. The person seeking damages is seeking property damages resulting from A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT IN WHICH TWO PERSONS ARE AT FAULT; 2. The person seeking damages is seeking to recover DIRECT PHYSICAL PROPERTY DAMAGES OF NOT MORE THAN FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND INDIRECT PHYSICAL PROPERTY DAMAGES NOT TO EXCEED ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS; and 3. THE PERCENTAGE OF FAULT OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM RECOVERY IS SOUGHT IS OVER FIFTY PERCENT. This section applies regardless as to whether the person seeking … also seeks damages for personal injury, HOWEVER, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THIS SECTION.» The three conditions are conjunctive and must be stated together; within them a small property claim is paid in full with no reduction for the claimant’s own share. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 6 years from the accident [2] Six years from accrual, and as in Montana and Wyoming the personal-injury claim arrives through a RESIDUAL paragraph rather than through a section that names it: «5. An action for criminal conversation or for ANY OTHER INJURY TO THE PERSON OR RIGHTS OF ANOTHER NOT ARISING UPON CONTRACT, WHEN NOT OTHERWISE EXPRESSLY PROVIDED» (§ 28-01-16(5)). THE CLOSING SAVING IS LOAD-BEARING AND IS NOT DECORATION: «when not otherwise expressly provided» is precisely what § 26.1-41-19(4) uses to displace this period for no-fault benefit claims, so the six years govern the TORT claim against the other driver and not a claim for benefits against your own insurer. Note also the shape of the tort claim itself in a no-fault state: the six years are of no use for pain and suffering unless the injury is a «serious injury» within § 26.1-41-01(21), and are of use for economic loss only above what the no-fault benefits paid or will pay. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from when the damage became known [3] TWO YEARS FROM DISCOVERY WITH A FOUR-YEAR OUTER LIMIT FROM THE ACCIDENT, «WHICHEVER IS EARLIER» — AND THE STRUCTURE IS THE OPPOSITE OF HAWAII’S CLAIMANT-FRIENDLY «LATER OF», WHICH MAKES NORTH DAKOTA’S THE MORE DANGEROUS OF THE TWO TO MISREAD. «26.1-41-19. Limitation of actions. 1. IF NO BASIC OR OPTIONAL EXCESS NO-FAULT BENEFITS HAVE BEEN PAID for loss, an action for the benefits may be commenced NOT LATER THAN TWO YEARS AFTER THE INJURED PERSON SUFFERS THE LOSS AND EITHER KNOWS, OR IN THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE SHOULD KNOW, THAT THE LOSS WAS CAUSED BY THE ACCIDENT, OR NOT LATER THAN FOUR YEARS AFTER THE ACCIDENT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER. IF BASIC OR OPTIONAL EXCESS NO-FAULT BENEFITS HAVE BEEN PAID for loss, an action for recovery of further benefits for the loss by either the same or another claimant MAY BE COMMENCED NOT LATER THAN FOUR YEARS AFTER THE LAST PAYMENT OF BENEFITS.» So a paid claim gets four years from the LAST PAYMENT, while an unpaid one is caught by whichever of the two periods expires first. The field carries the two-year discovery period because it is the one that bites first in the ordinary case; the four-year cap and the four-years-from-last-payment rule are stated here because neither can be represented by a single value. TWO FURTHER PERIODS IN THE SAME SECTION ARE RECORDED RATHER THAN PUBLISHED: subsection 2 adds separate two-year and six-year periods for survivors’ benefits, and subsection 3 gives an assigned-claim claimant SIXTY DAYS from written notice of rejection. AND THIS SECTION DECIDES THE CONFLICT BEFORE IT ARISES: «4. THE TIME PERIOD LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION GOVERN ALL ACTIONS FOR BASIC AND OPTIONAL EXCESS NO-FAULT BENEFITS UNDER THIS CHAPTER NOTWITHSTANDING ANY LIMITATION PRESCRIBED ELSEWHERE IN THE LAWS OF THIS STATE», so it displaces § 28-01-16’s six years for benefit claims only, and § 28-01-16(1)’s six years on «a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied» remain the route for a non-benefit contract dispute with the insurer. |
| Regulator | North Dakota Insurance Department |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in North Dakota →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Contributory negligence: the claim «shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage», but damages are reduced «to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable» (Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1948, s. 2(1)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from when the damage became known [2] Three years from the date the cause of action accrued or, if later, the injured person’s date of knowledge (art. 7). |
| Regulator | Financial Conduct Authority (conduct) · Financial Ombudsman Service (complaints) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Northern Ireland →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Shared fault reduces a Nova Scotia award and never defeats it. «Where by the fault of two or more persons damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, the liability to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault but if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally», and nothing in that section renders anyone liable for damage to which their fault has not contributed (Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 95, s. 3(1)–(2)). There is no percentage at which the claim is barred. The court determines each person’s degree of fault (s. 4), and the amount of the loss, the fault and the degrees of fault are questions of fact (s. 5). One Nova Scotia sting is in the costs: where damages are occasioned by the fault of more than one party the court «has power to direct that the plaintiff shall bear some portion of the costs if the circumstances render this just» (s. 6) — a discretion, not the automatic proportionality New Brunswick applies next door. Apportion under c. 95 first, then apply the minor-injury cap to the non-pecuniary component. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [2] A claim «may not be brought after the earlier of (a) two years from the day on which the claim is discovered; and (b) fifteen years from the day on which the act or omission on which the claim is based occurred» (Limitation of Actions Act, S.N.S. 2014, c. 35, s. 8(1)). The discovery test has four limbs, and the fourth is the one that moves the start date in a soft-tissue claim: the claimant must have known, or ought reasonably to have known, that the loss occurred, that it was caused or contributed to by an act or omission, that the act or omission was the defendant’s, and «that the injury, loss or damage is sufficiently serious to warrant a proceeding» (s. 8(2)). For personal-injury claims only, a court «may disallow a defence based on the limitation period and allow the claim to proceed if it appears to the court to be just» on a balance of hardship, but never «if the claim is brought more than two years after the expiry of the limitation period» (s. 12(2)–(3), (6)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [4] Two years, and the figure hides two different triggers — neither of which is the accident for the indemnity claim. Every action against the insurer «in respect of a claim for indemnification for liability of the insured … shall be commenced within two years after the liability of the insured is established by a court of competent jurisdiction and not afterwards», while «every other action or proceeding against the insurer under the contract in respect of loss or damage to the automobile shall be commenced within two years from the time the loss or damage was sustained» (Automobile Insurance Contract Mandatory Conditions Regulations, mandatory condition 6(3)). The two years published here is the vehicle-damage clock, which does run from the loss; the indemnity clock starts only when a court has established the insured’s liability, so a row reading «two years from the accident» would be wrong for it. |
| Regulator | Nova Scotia Superintendent of Insurance (Department of Finance and Treasury Board) |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Nova Scotia →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) The label is the closest the dataset has, but the statute fixes no percentage and the rule must be read in its own comparative terms: contributory negligence «shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence of the person so injured, damaged or killed, is of greater degree than any negligence of the person, firm or corporation causing such damage, or unless … is of greater degree than the combined negligence of any persons, firms or corporations causing such damage» (23 O.S. § 13). Equal fault is not barred. In the multi-defendant case the comparison is against the defendants’ COMBINED negligence, so a claimant at 40 % against two defendants at 30 % each is not barred even though they are the single most negligent party. Below the bar, recovery «shall be diminished in proportion» (§ 14), and shared fault is a jury question «in all cases whatsoever» (§ 12). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [3] Two years under the residual negligence limb of the same paragraph, «an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated» (12 O.S. § 95(A)(3)). The one-year period in the next paragraph was tested and rejected: § 95(A)(4) reaches «libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment» — the intentional torts by name — and a negligently inflicted crash injury is none of them. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 5 years from the accident [3] Five years on «any contract, agreement, or promise in writing» (12 O.S. § 95(A)(1)), and unlike some states’ equivalents the paragraph is not confined to an action for debt. But this is the statutory backstop, not the operative deadline: the policy’s own suit-limitation clause governs, bounded by the floor in 36 O.S. § 3617 — a clause «preventing the bringing of an action against any such insurer for more than six (6) months after the cause of action accrues» is void, as is any clause cutting the period below two years for non-property insurance or below one year from the date of the occurrence for property insurance, and the void clause «shall not affect the validity of the other provisions of the policy». Read the suit-limitation clause in the policy, because that, bounded by this floor, is the deadline that will be argued. |
| Regulator | Oklahoma Insurance Department |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Oklahoma →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Where the plaintiff’s own fault contributed, «the court shall apportion the damages in proportion to the degree of fault or negligence found against the parties respectively» (Negligence Act, s. 3). Vehicle-damage recovery from your own insurer is likewise «based on the degree of fault» under the Fault Determination Rules (Insurance Act, s. 263(3)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from when the damage became known [1] Same basic two-year period; a claim is discovered when the person knew, or ought to have known, that the injury occurred, was caused by an act or omission of the defendant, and that a proceeding was the appropriate remedy (s. 5). |
| Regulator | Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario (FSRA) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Ontario →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Contributory negligence does not bar recovery «if the fault attributable to the claimant was not greater than the combined fault of all persons specified in subsection (2)», and otherwise damages fall in proportion to the claimant’s own share (ORS 31.600(1)). The comparison is against the combined fault of everyone on the list, not against any single defendant. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [3] «An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years» (ORS 12.110(1)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [3] Six years on the policy as a contract (ORS 12.080(1)); the policy’s own suit-limitation clause may be shorter and was not read, and whether Oregon law sets a floor on such a clause was not searched. A uninsured or underinsured motorist claim is on a far shorter and quite different clock: under ORS 742.504(12)(a) no cause of action accrues at all unless, within two years of the accident, the amount due has been agreed, arbitration has been formally instituted, an action against the insurer has been filed, or suit has been filed against the uninsured motorist — and negotiating with your own insurer is none of those four things. |
| Regulator | Oregon Division of Financial Regulation |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Oregon →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Contributory negligence does not bar recovery «where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant»; damages are diminished in proportion (42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] «An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect … of another» — two years (42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 4 years from the accident [1] An action for unpaid first-party benefits: four years from the accident, or four years from the last payment if benefits were paid (75 Pa.C.S. § 1721(a)); a general action on the policy as a written contract also runs four years (42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(8)). |
| Regulator | Pennsylvania Insurance Department |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Pennsylvania →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence «Si la imprudencia sólo hubiere concurrido en la producción del daño, la indemnización será reducida por el juez, según las circunstancias» — where the victim’s imprudence merely contributed, the judge reduces the award according to the circumstances (Código Civil art. 1973); no threshold bars recovery and the code fixes no percentage. Where that imprudence was the determining cause of the harm under the objective head of art. 1970, there is no duty to repair at all (art. 1972). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [1] Same two-year rule of art. 2001 inc. 4 for the extracontractual indemnity action. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [4] This is the SOAT claim only: the right to ask the insurer for the compulsory indemnity «se extingue dentro del plazo de prescripción de la acción indemnizatoria por responsabilidad extracontractual, conforme al numeral 4 del artículo 2001 del Código Civil» (TUO art. 18, as substituted by D.S. 009-2019-MTC), and for a death claim that period does not begin until the insurer’s publication and notification duty under art. 42 has run out. It is a separate clock from actions founded on an insurance contract, which prescribe in ten years from the loss (Ley 29946 art. 78) — the two are not merged here. |
| Regulator | Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP (SBS) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Peru →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Sharing is by the gravity of each party’s fault, not by a percentage of causation: «where an injury has been caused by several persons, liability is shared between them in proportion to the seriousness of the fault of each. The victim is included in the apportionment when the injury is partly the effect of his own fault» (Civil Code of Québec, art. 1478). There is no bar at any percentage, and the rule reaches property damage, because the bodily-injury action is abolished. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [1] This is a claim to a public insurer, not a court action: the bodily-injury action is abolished, and entitlement to SAAQ compensation «is prescribed by three years from the accident or the time the injury appears and, with regard to a death benefit, from the time of death» (Automobile Insurance Act, art. 11). A claim to the Société interrupts the Civil Code prescription until a final decision is rendered. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [3] The action on the insurance contract has no special period, so the general three years of art. 2925 applies, with art. 2926 postponing the start where the harm appears late. The Civil Code fixes no shorter contractual deadline. |
| Regulator | Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Quebec →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence THERE IS NO BAR AT ANY PERCENTAGE IN RHODE ISLAND. «§ 9-20-4. Comparative negligence. In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where personal injuries have resulted in death, OR FOR INJURY TO PROPERTY, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property or person having control over the property, MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IN THE EXERCISE OF DUE CARE OR THE FACT THAT THE DANGER OR DEFECT WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS SHALL NOT BAR A RECOVERY, BUT DAMAGES SHALL BE DIMINISHED BY THE FINDER OF FACT IN PROPORTION TO THE AMOUNT OF NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PERSON INJURED.» The section states only that contributory fault «shall not bar a recovery» and that damages are diminished proportionately, WITH NO THRESHOLD ANYWHERE IN IT — so A RHODE ISLAND CLAIMANT NINETY PER CENT AT FAULT STILL RECOVERS TEN PER CENT. That puts Rhode Island with New Mexico and against every other state promoted in the same round: Idaho, Maine and North Dakota bar at equality, Montana and Vermont above fifty per cent. Note that the section covers INJURY TO PROPERTY expressly as well as personal injury and death, so the same rule governs the claim for the car. AND NOTE WHAT THE 2019 AMENDMENTS ADDED, because it is recent, statutory and easy to miss: the words «or the fact that the danger or defect was open and obvious shall not bar a recovery» — ABOLISHING THE OPEN-AND-OBVIOUS DEFENCE AS A BAR. The history line is «P.L. 1971, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 256, § 1», and the pairing of two identical 2019 chapters is the Rhode Island drafting habit — every substantive change read for this row arrives as a pair of companion chapters, so cite both or neither. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years from accrual: «(b) ACTIONS FOR INJURIES TO THE PERSON SHALL BE COMMENCED AND SUED WITHIN THREE (3) YEARS NEXT AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION SHALL ACCRUE, AND NOT AFTER, except as provided for otherwise in subsection (c) herein. Notwithstanding anything herein, any claim based on sexual abuse or exploitation of a child shall be governed by § 9-1-51» (§ 9-1-14(b)). QUOTE SUBSECTION (b) AND NOT THE SECTION: subsection (a) of the same section is the ONE-YEAR period for «words spoken», which is what a careless read of «§ 9-1-14» produces. AND NOTE WHAT THE SECTION DOES NOT CONTAIN — there is no property-damage paragraph in it at all, which is why the vehicle claim runs on § 9-1-13(a)’s residual ten years and not on these three. A reader who assumes one Rhode Island period for the whole crash will be wrong in one direction or the other. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [2] THREE YEARS, EXTENDABLE BY A FURTHER 120 DAYS IN THE DIRECT-ACTION CASE ONLY — AND THE CONDITIONS MUST BE STATED EXACTLY, BECAUSE THE EXTENSION IS NOT A GENERAL GRACE PERIOD. «(c) As to an action for personal injuries wherein an injured party is entitled to proceed against an insurer pursuant to § 27-7-2, WHERE AN ACTION IS OTHERWISE PROPERLY FILED AGAINST AN INSURED WITHIN THE TIME LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THIS SECTION, AND PROCESS AGAINST THE INSURED TORTFEASOR HAS BEEN RETURNED “NON EST INVENTUS” AND FILED WITH THE COURT, THEN THE STATUTORY LIMITATION FOR FILING AN ACTION UNDER § 27-7-2 DIRECTLY AGAINST AN INSURER SHALL BE EXTENDED AN ADDITIONAL ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) DAYS after the expiration of the time limitation provided for in subsection (b) herein» (§ 9-1-14(c)) — a 120-day extension found in no other jurisdiction in this dataset. All three conditions are cumulative: the suit must ALREADY have been properly filed against the insured within the three years, AND process against the tortfeasor must have been returned «non est inventus», AND that return must have been filed with the court. THE NO-JOINDER RULE IS THE REASON THE MECHANISM EXISTS AND IS PUBLISHED WITH IT: an injured party «in his or her suit against the insured, SHALL NOT JOIN THE INSURER AS A DEFENDANT», and may proceed directly against the insurer only where process is returned «non est inventus», or in three situations involving the insured’s death, or «after having obtained judgment against the insured alone … in a separate action against the insurer»; and «the time limitations for filing such actions shall be governed by the provisions of § 9-1-14 as appropriate, including … any extension of the statute of limitations for injuries to the person provided by § 9-1-14(c)» (§ 27-7-2). A FIRST-PARTY DISPUTE ON YOUR OWN POLICY IS A DIFFERENT CLOCK AND IS NAMED SEPARATELY: an action on the policy as a contract falls into § 9-1-13(a)’s residual TEN years. |
| Regulator | Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation, Insurance Division |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Rhode Island →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence In property-damage actions and in a claim brought in the elected tort stream, «the liability to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault, but if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally», and nothing renders a person liable for loss to which their fault has not contributed (Contributory Negligence Act, s. 2). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [1] In the default no-fault stream this is a claim deadline, not a limitation period: a claimant must apply for a benefit «within two years after the date of the accident» or, where symptoms not apparent immediately after the accident are observed by a practitioner within those two years, within two years of that first observation; a death claim runs two years from the death and a claimant who was a minor has two years from turning eighteen (Automobile Accident Insurance Act, s. 164(1)–(3)). A claimant who has filed a tort election sues instead, and the two-year discovery period of the Limitations Act applies to that action. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 90 days from the denial [1] Far shorter than any general limitation period: a claimant may appeal a decision of the insurer «to either the Court of King’s Bench or the appeal commission within the later of: (a) 90 days after the date of insurer’s written decision; and (b) if a claimant has requested mediation … 90 days after the date of the mediator’s written statement … declaring that the mediation is completed» (Automobile Accident Insurance Act, s. 191(1)), and choosing the court closes the commission (s. 191(2)). Mediation itself must be requested within 90 days of the written decision (s. 190(2)). Two decisions carry 180 days instead: benefits withheld after a criminal charge (s. 107(4)) and a non-resident’s responsibility determination (s. 109(2)). |
| Regulator | Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Saskatchewan →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 applies in Scotland (s. 5): damages are reduced «to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable» having regard to the pursuer’s share of responsibility. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from when the damage became known [2] Three years from the date the injuries were sustained or, if later, from when the pursuer became (or could reasonably have become) aware of the key facts (s. 17(2)). |
| Regulator | Financial Conduct Authority (conduct) · Financial Ombudsman Service (complaints) |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Scotland →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) The bar is judge-made, not statutory: «For all causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1991, a plaintiff in a negligence action may recover damages if his or her negligence is not greater than that of the defendant. The amount of the plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of his or her negligence» (Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 245, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991), quoted with its page by the Court of Appeals). «Not greater than» is the 51 % form: a driver exactly half to blame recovers half, and one fifty-one percent to blame recovers nothing. Apportionment is a question of fact for the jury where conflicting inferences may be drawn. Do not read S.C. Code § 15-38-15 as the source of the bar — it governs joint and several liability among defendants, and its own subsection (C)(2) sends the plaintiff’s share back to «applicable rules concerning comparative negligence». |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from when the damage became known [5] Three years for «an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not enumerated by law» (§ 15-3-530(5)), and the accrual rule is discovery because § 15-3-535 attaches it to that paragraph in terms: «all actions initiated under Section 15-3-530(5) must be commenced within three years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action.» The Editor’s Note on both sections records that the period was reduced from six to three years in 1988. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [5] Three years for «an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied» (§ 15-3-530(1)) — the same three years as the tort periods, so suing your own insurer buys no extra time, which is unusual in this dataset. And the paragraph that would override a policy’s own shortened suit clause «any clause, condition, or limitation contained in the policy to the contrary notwithstanding» is § 15-3-530(8), which on its face reaches policies «either fire or life» and so does not protect an insured suing under an automobile policy. Read the suit-limitation clause in the motor policy, because nothing on this text disapplies it. Whether any other provision of Title 38 sets a floor on such a clause has not yet been verified against a primary text and is not stated here; chapters 38-59, 38-61, 38-63 and 38-77 were read in full and contain none. |
| Regulator | South Carolina Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in South Carolina →
| Shared-fault rule | Not yet verified SOUTH DAKOTA’S SHARED-FAULT RULE HAS NO PERCENTAGE IN IT AT ALL, AND THE FIELD IS «UNCLEAR» BECAUSE NONE OF THIS DATASET’S ENUMERATED VALUES DESCRIBES IT — not because the statute is unread. It is quoted here verbatim so a reader can see for themselves: «In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to that person’s property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence does not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in such case, the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Notwithstanding Woods vs. City of Crooks, 559 N.W.2d 558 (SD 1997), the determination of whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant shall be made without disclosing any determination of percentage of plaintiff’s fault by special interrogatory» (§ 20-9-2, history «SL 1941, ch 160; SDC Supp 1960, § 47.0304-1; SL 1964, ch 149; SL 1998, ch 125, § 1»). WHY NOT ONE OF THE OTHER VALUES: it is not «pure-comparative», because recovery survives only where the claimant’s negligence was SLIGHT; it is not «contributory», because slight negligence does not bar and the damages do reduce proportionally; and it is neither «modified-50» nor «modified-51», because the statute fixes no figure to compare against. Assigning it to a camp by analogy would be an import, so the enum is left «unclear» and the statute speaks for itself — the same discipline this dataset applies to New Mexico, where the reason is a locator rule rather than a mapping one. THE 1998 SECOND SENTENCE MATTERS IN PRACTICE: because the comparison must be made WITHOUT a special interrogatory disclosing the plaintiff’s percentage, the question a South Dakota jury answers is qualitative and is never published as a number — so any percentage you meet attached to this state has come from somewhere else. Read it beside § 58-33-67(6), which makes it an unfair practice for an insurer to fail «to make a good faith assignment of the degree of contributory negligence in ascertaining the issue of liability». |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years from accrual, and the subdivision that fixes it is three words long: «Except where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute, the following civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can be commenced only within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued: … (3) An action for personal injury» (§ 15-2-14(3), history «SDC 1939, § 33.0232 (5); SL 1945, ch 144»). South Dakota fixes the injury period by that phrase alone, and NO MOTOR-VEHICLE-SPECIFIC PERIOD WAS FOUND in anything read. |
| Regulator | South Dakota Division of Insurance, Department of Labor and Regulation |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in South Dakota →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence For injuries, the victim’s own contribution reduces compensation by at most 75 % (LRCSCVM art. 1.2); children under 14 and people without legal capacity are not reduced at all. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 1 years from when the damage became known [1] Same one-year period; for injuries the clock runs from stabilisation of the injuries, not the crash date, under settled case law. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 2 years from the accident [2] Actions arising from the insurance contract: two years for property insurance, five for insurance of persons (LCS art. 23). |
| Regulator | Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Spain →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Proportionate responsibility: you recover nothing if your share of responsibility is greater than 50 %; otherwise your damages are reduced by your percentage (CPRC §§ 33.001, 33.012). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [1] For a death, the two years run from the date of death. |
| Regulator | Texas Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Texas →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (50% bar) A claimant «may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery» (§ 78B-5-818(2)). Because the others’ fault must exceed the claimant’s, a fifty-fifty crash in Utah recovers nothing — the opposite of Nevada and Oregon, where it recovers half. No defendant is liable beyond its own allocated proportion. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 4 years from the accident [3] A crash injury falls under the four-year catch-all, «for relief not otherwise provided for by law» (§ 78B-2-307(4)), because no section of the limitations chapter enumerates personal injury — the chapter was read end to end to establish that. A wrongful-death action is the trap: it runs only two years (§ 78B-2-304(3)), half the injury period, on the same crash. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [4] «A person shall commence an action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance within three years after the inception of the loss» (§ 31A-21-313(1)(a)) — shorter than the four-year tort period and running from the loss, not from a denial. Two coverages are carved out to four years, each with its own retroactivity date: uninsured motorist since 14 May 2019 (§ 31A-22-305(11)) and personal injury protection since 3 May 2023 (§ 31A-22-307(7)). A Utah policy may not shorten any of these: § 31A-21-313(3)(a) voids a clause limiting the time «to a time less than that authorized by statute». In the other direction, § 31A-21-313(4)(a) generally bars suing the insurer for payment until the earlier of 60 days after proof of loss, waiver of proof of loss, or the insurer’s denial of full payment. |
| Regulator | Utah Insurance Department |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Utah →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Vermont’s bar bites only ABOVE the defendants’ combined causal negligence: «§ 1036. Contributory and comparative negligence. (a) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE SHALL NOT BAR RECOVERY in an action by any plaintiff, or the plaintiff’s legal representative, to recover damages for negligence resulting in death, personal injury, or property damage, IF THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT GREATER THAN THE CAUSAL TOTAL NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT OR DEFENDANTS, BUT THE DAMAGE SHALL BE DIMINISHED BY GENERAL VERDICT IN PROPORTION TO THE AMOUNT OF NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PLAINTIFF. WHERE RECOVERY IS ALLOWED AGAINST MORE THAN ONE DEFENDANT, EACH DEFENDANT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR THAT PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNT AWARDED AS DAMAGES IN THE RATIO OF THE AMOUNT OF THE DEFENDANT’S CAUSAL NEGLIGENCE TO THE AMOUNT OF CAUSAL NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTED TO ALL DEFENDANTS AGAINST WHOM RECOVERY IS ALLOWED.» «Not greater than» is the 51 % form in this dataset’s convention, so A CRASH APPORTIONED FIFTY-FIFTY IN VERMONT RECOVERS HALF — THE OPPOSITE OUTCOME FROM MAINE AND IDAHO NEXT DOOR, which bar a claimant found equally at fault, and the same camp as Montana, Iowa, West Virginia, Hawaii and Wyoming. THREE FEATURES OF THE TEXT MATTER BEYOND THE THRESHOLD. The comparison is against the defendants’ COMBINED causal negligence, which helps a claimant facing several of them. Against that, liability among defendants is PROPORTIONATE AND NOT JOINT — «each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded … in the ratio of the amount of the defendant’s causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed» — so Vermont has no joint and several liability in the ordinary negligence case and the claimant carries an insolvent co-defendant’s share. That is the MIRROR IMAGE of Maine’s § 156, where joint and several liability survives in full. And the reduction is made «BY GENERAL VERDICT», not by a special verdict as Idaho’s § 6-802, Hawaii’s § 663-31(b) and North Dakota’s § 32-03.2-02 variously require or allow — so the arithmetic is folded into the single figure the jury returns. One further subsection is recorded for completeness and for currency, and expressly does NOT touch motor claims: «(b) Contributory and comparative negligence shall be prohibited as a defense to limit a plaintiff’s recovery for damages in an action for a negligence claim relating to a sexual act as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 3251 or sexual conduct as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 2821» — added 22 April 2024, so a reader is not misled into thinking Vermont’s comparative rule changed recently. The rule itself dates from 1969 as amended in 1980. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from when the damage became known [2] Three years — AND, UNUSUALLY, FROM DISCOVERY ON THE FACE OF THE STATUTE, WHICH IS THE DETAIL A PARAPHRASE RELIABLY DROPS. «Actions for the following causes shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not after: (1) assault and battery; (2) false imprisonment; (3) slander and libel; (4) except as otherwise provided in this chapter, INJURIES TO THE PERSON SUFFERED BY THE ACT OR DEFAULT OF ANOTHER PERSON, PROVIDED THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION SHALL BE DEEMED TO ACCRUE AS OF THE DATE OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE INJURY» (12 V.S.A. § 512(4)). So Period.from is «discovery» rather than «accident», and publishing «accident» for Vermont bodily injury would be wrong. THE CONTRAST WITH ITS NEIGHBOUR IS EXACT AND WORTH STATING: Idaho’s § 5-219(4) says the opposite for its own two years — the cause of action accrues at the occurrence and the period «shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom» — so the two states differ on the TRIGGER as well as on the length, and a regional generalisation fails in both directions. Note the paragraph’s own opening saving, «except as otherwise provided in this chapter», which was not tested here. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [3] Six years for an action on the policy, which arrives through Vermont’s residual civil period rather than through any insurance provision: «§ 511. Civil action. A civil action, except one brought upon the judgment or decree of a court of record of the United States or of this or some other state, AND EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED, SHALL BE COMMENCED WITHIN SIX YEARS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES AND NOT THEREAFTER» (Amended 1959, No. 261, § 3). TWO THINGS THIS ROW DOES NOT CLAIM ARE STATED RATHER THAN LEFT IMPLICIT. The saving «except as otherwise provided» was not tested, and no Vermont statute read for this jurisdiction fixes a shorter period for a first-party motor claim; and THE POLICY’S OWN SUIT-LIMITATION CONDITION WAS NOT EXAMINED, so a contractual clause may cut the six years down. Note also that § 941(g)’s thirty days is not a limitation period of any kind — it is a disclosure duty on the insurer. |
| Regulator | Vermont Department of Financial Regulation, Insurance Division |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Vermont →
| Shared-fault rule | Pure comparative negligence Contributory fault chargeable to the claimant «diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages … but does not bar recovery», and the section sets no percentage threshold anywhere (RCW 4.22.005). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] The same subdivision carries both clocks: «any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated» — three years (RCW 4.16.080(2)). |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 6 years from the accident [2] «An action upon a contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement» — six years (RCW 4.16.040(1)). This is the statutory ceiling, not the practical deadline: the policy’s own suit-limitation clause governs, and RCW 48.18.200(1)(c) only forbids that clause from running shorter than one year, voiding anything shorter. Whether collision cover on a motor policy is «property insurance» under that subsection — which decides whether the one year runs from accrual or from the date of loss — is not settled by the text and is not stated here. |
| Regulator | Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner |
Verified as ofSeptember 10, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Washington →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) West Virginia’s whole shared-fault regime dates from a single 2015 act and must not be described as older. «Any fault chargeable to the plaintiff shall not bar recovery by the plaintiff unless the plaintiff’s fault is greater than the combined fault of all other persons responsible for the total amount of damages, if any, to be awarded. If the plaintiff’s fault is less than the combined fault of all other persons, the plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff’s degree of fault» (§ 55-7-13c(c)). «Greater than» is the 51 % form, so a crash apportioned fifty-fifty still recovers half — as in Iowa, and the opposite of Kansas and Nebraska. The comparison is against the COMBINED fault of all other responsible persons, not against each defendant. The same section makes each defendant’s liability «several only and … not joint», each liable «only for the amount of compensatory damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault», with joint liability restored where two or more defendants «consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design» (§ 55-7-13c(a)–(b)). Two carve-outs matter in a crash case: a defendant whose conduct constitutes «driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any other drug», or «criminal conduct», which is a proximate cause of the damages, is jointly and severally liable anyway (§ 55-7-13c(h)). And if a liable defendant turns out to be uncollectible, the plaintiff may move «not later than one year after judgment becomes final» to have the uncollectible amount reallocated among the others by percentage of fault — including a plaintiff at fault — though never against a defendant whose percentage «is equal to or less than the plaintiff’s percentage of fault» (§ 55-7-13c(d)(1)). |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 2 years from the accident [2] Two years «next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries» (§ 55-2-12(b)), from the section headed «Personal actions not otherwise provided for». But the deadline that catches West Virginians is neither of the two-year clocks: a third-party claimant’s only remedy for an unfair claims settlement practice is an administrative complaint to the Insurance Commissioner, and that is due within ONE YEAR of actual or implied discovery — see the deadline recorded against the insurer. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 1 years from when the damage became known [5] THIS IS NOT A DEADLINE TO SUE — IT IS THE ONLY REMEDY A THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT HAS, AND IT IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE ONE. West Virginia has abolished the third-party bad-faith action outright: «A third-party claimant may not bring a private cause of action or any other action against any person for an unfair claims settlement practice. A third-party claimant’s sole remedy against a person for an unfair claims settlement practice or the bad faith settlement of a claim is the filing of an administrative complaint with the Commissioner … A third-party claimant may not include allegations of unfair claims settlement practices in any underlying litigation against an insured» (§ 33-11-4a(a)). The complaint «shall be filed as soon as practicable but in no event later than one year following the actual or implied discovery of the alleged unfair claims settlement practice» (§ 33-11-4a(b)) — half the two-year limitation period for the underlying claim, and on a different clock. It must state the statutory provision if known, the facts, the people involved and the relevant policy language; if it is deficient «the Commissioner shall contact the third-party claimant within fifteen days of receipt of the complaint to obtain the necessary information». No West Virginia limitation period for a SUIT on a motor policy was read this round, and none is stated here. |
| Regulator | West Virginia Offices of the Insurance Commissioner |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in West Virginia →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Contributory negligence does not bar recovery «if that negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought», with damages «diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering» — and then the decisive sentence: «The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent» (Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1)). A claimant at exactly 50 % still recovers half. The 51 % figure in the same subsection is a different rule entirely: a defendant at 51 % or more is jointly and severally liable for the whole award, while one below that pays only its own share. It is not a bar on the claimant. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years for an action to recover damages for injuries to the person, «including an action to recover damages for injuries to the person caused or sustained by or arising from an accident involving a motor vehicle» (Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a)) — the statute names the motor case expressly, so no interpretive step is needed. A wrongful-death claim arising from a motor vehicle accident is shorter: two years (§ 893.54(2m)), against three years for other wrongful-death claims, and shorter than the injured survivor’s own period for the same crash. |
| Deadline to sue your own insurer | 3 years from the accident [2] Three years, not the general six: «An action upon a motor vehicle insurance policy described in s. 632.32(1) shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred» — and the accrual rule removes the usual trap, because «a cause of action involving underinsured motorist coverage … or uninsured motorist coverage … accrues on the date there is final resolution of the underlying cause of action by the injured party against the tortfeasor» (Wis. Stat. § 893.43(2)). The policy cannot shorten it: no insurance policy may «limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less than that authorized by the statutes», prescribe the court, or provide that no action may be brought (§ 631.83(3)(a)–(c)). You must, however, wait — no action to compel payment may be brought until at least sixty days after proof of loss (§ 631.83(4)). |
| Regulator | Office of the Commissioner of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Wisconsin →
| Shared-fault rule | Modified comparative (51% bar) Wyoming’s bar bites only ABOVE fifty per cent: «Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any claimant or the claimant’s legal representative to recover damages for wrongful death or injury to person or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the claimant» (§ 1-1-109(b)). «Not more than fifty percent» is the 51 % form in this dataset’s convention, so A CRASH APPORTIONED FIFTY-FIFTY IN WYOMING STILL RECOVERS HALF. THREE FEATURES MATTER MORE THAN THE HEADLINE. First, the denominator is «the total fault of ALL ACTORS», and «actor» is defined to include any person «whose fault is determined to be a proximate cause … whether or not the actor is a party to the litigation» (§ 1-1-109(a)(i)), so an absent, unidentified or immune driver’s share counts in the comparison. Second, the statute speaks of «fault», defined in (a)(iv) to reach strict tort and products liability, breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse of a product, not negligence alone. Third — and this is the practical consequence — WYOMING APPORTIONS SEVERALLY, NOT JOINTLY: «Each defendant is liable only to the extent of that defendant’s proportion of the total fault» (§ 1-1-109(e)), so a defendant found thirty per cent at fault pays thirty per cent and the claimant carries the shortfall if a co-defendant cannot pay. The court must «direct the jury to determine the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant without regard to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor» and must «inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault» (§ 1-1-109(c)(i)) — the exact opposite of South Dakota’s § 20-9-2, which forbids disclosing the plaintiff’s percentage by special interrogatory. |
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| Deadline to sue for injury | 4 years from the accident [2] Four years from accrual, and WYOMING NAMES NO «PERSONAL INJURY» PERIOD OF ITS OWN — an injury claim lands in the residual tort clause: «(iv) Within four (4) years, an action for: … (C) An injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated» (§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C)). Note the carve-out that makes four years the NEGLIGENCE period specifically: subdivision (v) gives only one year for assault or battery, libel and slander. |
| Regulator | Wyoming Department of Insurance |
Verified as ofSeptember 11, 2026 · Car insurance claims in Wyoming →
Frequently asked questions
Is a litigation-propensity score discoverable?
Assume a claimant's lawyer will ask for it, and build the file so the answer is survivable either way — the actual rule belongs to your procedural law and to any privilege that applies, and nothing here should be read as stating it for any jurisdiction. The question that matters more is what the score sits next to. A file in which a propensity score is followed by claim-specific reasoning about liability, injury and quantum tells a coherent story whatever is disclosed. A file in which the offer moved when the score moved, with nothing in between, tells a different story, and it tells it to a reader who is looking for exactly that. Prepare on the assumption that the second pattern is the one that gets found.
Our severity model predicts more than our authorised offer. Is that a problem?
It is the document a competent opponent most wants, and how dangerous it is depends on what the difference represents. A severity prediction of ultimate cost includes defence expense, interest, the tail of an unresolved injury and the possibility of a verdict, so it is not the same quantity as the value of the claim today, and a coherent file explains the difference in those terms. What is hard to explain is a pattern: predictions systematically above offers across a portfolio, with no reasoning that accounts for the gap. That is a bad-faith narrative assembled from your own records, and the defence against it is written at the time, in the file, one claim at a time — not reconstructed afterwards from a model specification.
Should handlers see the scores?
For reserving and routing, yes; for negotiation, the honest answer is that we do not know how to give a handler a severity number without it becoming an anchor, and neither does anyone else. A handler who has seen a prediction cannot unsee it, and the prediction will shape the range they consider reasonable before they have formed a view of their own. Some organisations withhold severity from the negotiating handler and hold it at portfolio level, which protects the negotiation and costs the handler information they could use legitimately. There is no clean answer here. What can be done is to require that the handler's own valuation is written before the score is opened, which at least records that a judgement existed.
This guide explains how car insurance claims generally work. It is not legal advice, does not create a lawyer–client relationship, and is not a statement of any insurer's or regulator's position. Rules change and differ by jurisdiction; check the cited instrument and, where money or injury is at stake, consult a licensed professional in your jurisdiction.